Nonconceptuality and the Emotions :: Conceptuality Psychology Papers

Nonconceptuality and the Emotions I present an argument for the existence of nonconceptual states. A nonconceptual state is an intentional state which does not require the bearer to possess all requisite concepts in order to represent the state. I frame the debate by outlining two constraints that an argument for nonconceptuality should meet. First, successful argument must present a platitude of concepts and illustrate that there are intentional states which both actually violate this platitude (the empirical constraint) and explain behavior independently of conceptual states (the robustness constraint). This ensures that the notion of nonconceptuality established by the argument will have a significant part in the explanatory arsenal of the intentional psychologist. Secondly, I formulate a platitude of concepts based on the intuition that an individual can only legitimately be held responsible for behavior caused by conceptual states. After qualifying the platitude, I argue that emotional states actually violate th e platitude and meet the necessary constraints. Finally, I defend my argument against two challenges: one which denies that the empirical constraint has been met and the other which denies that the robustness constraint has been met. I conclude my discussion with some general remarks on the nature of nonconceptual representation. Any satisfactory model of the emotions must at once recognize their place within intentional psychology and acknowledge their uniqueness as mental causes. In the first half of the century, the theories of James and Freud had considerable influence on reinforcing the idea that emotions are non-intentional. (1) The uniqueness of emotions was therefore acknowledged at the price of denying them content, of denying them a place within intentional psychology proper. More recently, cognitive reductionists like Joel Marks and Martha Nussbaum recognize that emotions are intentional but, by reducing them to beliefs, judgements, desires, etc., fail to capture their distinctiveness as mental causes. (2) In other words, their place within intentional psychology is acknowledged at the price of denying them their uniqueness. Anti-reductionists, as I see them, are committed to the idea that emotions are both intentional and unique. This uniqueness, however, is rarely, if ever, traced to emotional content itself. An anti-reductionist is more likely to single out, e.g., a phenomenological, evaluative or perspectival feature which, as purportedly distinctive of emotional experience, precludes the reduction of emotions to, say, cognitive states. (3) My intention is not to assess these efforts. Rather, I want to offer an argument which shows that emotions are unique in virtue of the kind of intentionality they have.